Can We Have A Civil Discussion About The War Between The States ?

[Imran Siddiqui]

I think Lee is generally overrated as a commander. Jackson was the shining star of the Civil War. HE was the great general, and consequently made Lee look that much better.

Longstreet was also brilliant. Jackson and Longstreet were the two greatest generals of the war. Lee, I believe, is tied with Grant and Sherman in the 2nd bracket (though I would have loved to see Winfield Scott Hancock get a change to lead the AotP).

[Velociryx]

I would agree, provisionally, Imran.

What *made* Lee great was his ability to (most of the time) read the battlefield, and more importantly, the character of those he squared off against. After that, the thing that cinched it for him was he knew WHEN to get out of the way and let his subordinates do their d@mndest.

And that's really the pivotal point. Even IF there was a singular Union General that could be considered Lee's equal, that General *still* could not outperform Lee's army at its finest, because of Lee's supporting cast. Collectively, they (Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart) were very nearly the four horsemen of the Union Apocalypse.

-=Vel=-

[Lawrence of Arabia]

Nathan Bedford Forrest was one of the founding memebers of the KKK.

[MichaeltheGreat]

Lee's greatness as a general is defined by the Seven Days battles.

Taking command from a wounded general who didn't even communicate with his own staff, having no relationship with most of his new subordinate commanders, who wouldn't, couldn't, or didn't work together, with a small, inexperienced staff, and outnumbered within sight of the suburbs of his state's and nation's capital.

Lee took what by all rights should have been an impossible situation, and turned it around so effectively that he drove one Yankee army into retreat, disengaged from that front, then moved and crushed another Yankee army, and was in a position to go on the offensive in enemy territory.

Jackson (especially) and his men were worn out during the Seven Days' campaign, having just come in from their work in the Valley, and Longstreet was then just a divisional commander. Lee inherited Johnston's (dis)organization, and had to make do with the commanders and commands he had available to him, and he whooped Yankee ass and drove them out of the Richmond environs, when the war and the nation were all but lost.

Most importantly, in those first few weeks, Lee took over an army that was demoralized by the apparent inevitability and imminence of its defeat, its lack of supply, lack of organization, and the infighting of its commanders. Lee transformed that army completely, into a high morale army who believed they could do anything, and who nearly did.

[Lawrence of Arabia]

It would have been better if he would have lost - so many lives would have been saved.

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat


I've heard many pro-southern speakers and writers say that slavery wasn't the exclusive reason, or the main reason, but I've yet to hear any of them say it was not a reason at all for any southerners. And the monolithic south crap has been spouted in Yankee history textbooks for years, because (one would assume) they don't like to look at the notion that more moderate states had significant enough concerns about the expansion of Federal power assumed by Lincoln.

Please peruse this website: http://memebers.aol.com/jfepperson/causes.html

It includes the texts of speeches given by the most prominent secessionist politicians in the state houses of the south during the debates on whether to secede or not. You'll find that most of them expound on the need to perpetuate the "right" to own slaves. It seems to me that arguements coming directly from the founding fathers of the CSA are by far the best source regarding the rationale behind secession.

[Imran Siddiqui]

Lee transformed that army completely, into a high morale army who believed they could do anything, and who nearly did.

It's almost like you are describing Grant .

[MichaeltheGreat]

The Army of the Potomac never had morale problems. They had motivation problems with the idea of carrying out suicidal orders (the non-existent canal at Fredericksburg, the sunken road and charging in column across "Burnside's Bridge" at Sharpsburg) from incompetent commanders.

Even at Chancellorsville, when XI Corps and III Corps routed, and Hooker lost his nerve, the Army was pissed off that Couch, upon taking command in the field when Hooker was slightly wounded, continued with Hooker's order to withdraw from the field.

The Yankee armies had an abundance of supply, great strength in numbers, and always believed they could fight, if given the chance.

The Army of the Potomac, in particular, had a number of excellent subordinate commanders, but it was a lack of leadership at the top that hampered them, and an awkward command structure.

J. F. Reynolds, Couch, Buford, Hancock, Robinson and others were certainly the equals or better of the likes of Johnson, McLaws, Pickett, Ewell, or Heth.

Doc - I've read most of the speeches and texts, etc. My opinion is that it's pretty clear that slavery was at least first among equals, if not the primary reason, for secession for the original seven states of the CSA, which all had heavily cotton dependent economies. However, with the remaining seven states (four seceding and three declaring neutrality), there were a number of motivations, and slavery was strictly secondary. Virginia originally rejected secession by a wide margin, then voted again and seceded when Lincoln issued his extra-constitutional directive for state-provided and funded "volunteers."

The net results of Sumter were some damaged brick from an old, poorly maintained and little used fort, and one man lightly wounded on each side. Certainly if Lincoln had wanted to defuse the situation, some form of negotiation would have been possible, and the original seven state CSA would have found itself economically marginalized to the point that they would most likely petition for readmission to the Union within a matter of a few years.

Had Lincoln not pushed for a military solution to a political conflict, four states would never have seceded, and there would have been no reason for three to declare themselves "neutral." (which gives a very interesting view of the state's sense of their own sovereignty and the degree to which they were "subordinate" to the Federal government)

We've come to adopt the view (started down that road by Lincoln) that states are simply subordinate administrative units of a national government, with limited autonomy in a very few areas. That's a far cry from the original view that states were separate sovereign entities which created a treaty relationship among themselves for mutual defense, trade and common foreign policy.

[MichaeltheGreat]

Originally posted by Lawrence of Arabia
It would have been better if he would have lost - so many lives would have been saved.

It would have been even better if Lincoln hadn't started the war.

In any case, an early end in 1862 would not have led to a resolution of slavery.

[SlowwHand]

The slave-owners responded, the farmers fought the war.

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

Absolute racist that he was Forrest was the consumate general.

I read a great book about how Rommel had studied the tactics of Forrest to apply to the modern day armored cavalry.

To my mind Forrest was the best cavalry commander of the day.

Gettysburg while not truly strategic in nature did expend a huge amount of resources (read men and materiel) that the confederacy couldn't afford to waste and from that perspective represented the last gasp of the confederacy. Had the confeds won the field in the first day, I doubt the outcome would have been different.

In order for a meaningful result to have occurred the ANV would have had to make a meaningful threat against DC.

[Imran Siddiqui]

That's a far cry from the original view that states were separate sovereign entities which created a treaty relationship among themselves for mutual defense, trade and common foreign policy.

MtG, it was considered just a little bit more centralized than that . I mean, it wasn't like they were considering the present day EU .

[Dr Strangelove]

Originally posted by MichaeltheGreat
Doc - I've read most of the speeches and texts, etc. My opinion is that it's pretty clear that slavery was at least first among equals, if not the primary reason, for secession for the original seven states of the CSA, which all had heavily cotton dependent economies. However, with the remaining seven states (four seceding and three declaring neutrality), there were a number of motivations, and slavery was strictly secondary. Virginia originally rejected secession by a wide margin, then voted again and seceded when Lincoln issued his extra-constitutional directive for state-provided and funded "volunteers."

Was this method of raising troops different from that used to raise troops for the Mexican-American War or the War of 1812?
Pro-secessionist groups continued to lobby in all of those states throughout early 1861 and showed little evidence of letting up on their propaganda war. They forced repeated votes on secession in Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Texas. Thanks to an unrelenting propaganda campaign their margins of defeat were gradually shrinking. In Texas the pro-secessionists illegally imprisoned the governor. In Tennessee they seized the state government by excluding certain anti-secessionists from the vote. In Virginia, while secession carried by a slim majority delegates from the western part of the state, who might have cooled off the hotter heads, were unable to get back to Richmond in time to participate.

The net results of Sumter were some damaged brick from an old, poorly maintained and little used fort, and one man lightly wounded on each side. Certainly if Lincoln had wanted to defuse the situation, some form of negotiation would have been possible, and the original seven state CSA would have found itself economically marginalized to the point that they would most likely petition for readmission to the Union within a matter of a few years.

What makes you think that Davis wanted to defuse the situation? Do you think they would have stopped with this one fort? Had they not already seized several Federal facilities? I think it likely that they were willing to continue a campaign of small aggressions until they triggered a declaration of war and forced their "sisters' to decide on which they belonged. I might also add that Davis and some of the other proponents of secession like Preston Bryant had already promised to take western territories that they believed were rightfully theirs. Bryant in particular seemed to believe that any state which had abolished slavery other than those of the original thirteen which had done so were in violation of the Constitution and that the Confederacy has a "moral obligation" to correct the situation.
In any case an act in the 19th century firing on someone's fortifications was generally considered an act of war. It was at least up to Davis to abjectly apologize to Lincoln. Failing to do that was sort of saying "I'm not sorry I did that and I'll do it again if I feel like it." In former times this pretty much usually resulted in war. Come to think of it, if it happened in this centruy the aggressor would at least have to declare his intent to make amends in order to rpevnt war.

[SlowwHand]

"In Texas the pro-secessionists illegally imprisoned the governor."

Oh, we'd never do that in Texas.

[MichaeltheGreat]

Originally posted by Dr Strangelove

Was this method of raising troops different from that used to raise troops for the Mexican-American War or the War of 1812?

Both the situation and the methods were different. In the first two, you had foreign wars, one defensive and one in conquest, but both involving legitimate exercise of constitutional authority. Also, for example, Shay's Rebellion and the Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion involved legitimate Federal issues, as the state governments requested aid.

The raising of volunteers for Federal service in the two wars you cite was also different - no state was ordered to raise volunteers outside of it's existing militia units. Volunteer units were formed, but not on the basis of a Federal directive to the states, and not for an extraconstitutional purpose. The constitutional concept of a rebellion did not extend to a state government seceding from the Union - a reserved power under the Tenth Amendment, at least for the original signatory states. (The legality is less clear when a state petitioned for admission into the Union).

In event of a Federal-state conflict, the President clearly has the authority to use Federal troops in defense of Federal property, disputed or otherwise. There is no authority to compel other states to provide "volunteers" at state expense, nor was there any authority (remember the whole original opposition to any standing army) to quarter or move Federal troops through the sovereign territory of another state, in the absense of a war with a foreign power.

Whether one thinks it is practical or not, that is the framework agreed to and negotiated by the original signatories to the Constitution.

Pro-secessionist groups continued to lobby in all of those states throughout early 1861 and showed little evidence of letting up on their propaganda war. They forced repeated votes on secession in Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Texas. Thanks to an unrelenting propaganda campaign their margins of defeat were gradually shrinking.

Well, the Yankees certainly contributed to the sucess of the secesh PR campaign with their power grab after Sumter.

In Texas the pro-secessionists illegally imprisoned the governor. In Tennessee they seized the state government by excluding certain anti-secessionists from the vote.

Which they certainly couldn't have done without popular support. There was also bushwhacking and extralegal activities from both sides in other states.

In Virginia, while secession carried by a slim majority delegates from the western part of the state, who might have cooled off the hotter heads, were unable to get back to Richmond in time to participate.

In any event, Federal occupation of Arlington and Alexandria, and continued pressure to provide those regiments would have forced the issue.

What makes you think that Davis wanted to defuse the situation? Do you think they would have stopped with this one fort? Had they not already seized several Federal facilities? I think it likely that they were willing to continue a campaign of small aggressions until they triggered a declaration of war and forced their "sisters' to decide on which they belonged.

The CSA government leaders were generally hotheads, since they wouldn't have been selected without support of radical secessionists, but they were completely and utterly unprepared to fight a real war. What they wanted was removal of Federal facilities from their sovereign soil, but that certainly could have been negotiated - in fact, there were a number of "foreign relations" issues the CSA would have had to negotiate with the Yankees, from trade and taxation, to cross-border property and contract issues, etc.

Due to the low level of real militarization (discounting militias on both sides as mostly being a joke), the extent of CSA intent and strategic planning was to demonstrate a willingness to fight to secure their rights as an independent state, which was pretty much limited to getting those Yankee forts out of Confederate seaports. It was a demonstration of determination, not a declaration of war.

I might also add that Davis and some of the other proponents of secession like Preston Bryant had already promised to take western territories that they believed were rightfully theirs. Bryant in particular seemed to believe that any state which had abolished slavery other than those of the original thirteen which had done so were in violation of the Constitution and that the Confederacy has a "moral obligation" to correct the situation.

Rhetoric of hotheads for an audience of hotheads has to be reconciled with real capacity and demonstrated intentions. Stanton wanted to invade and conquer the rest of México and go on south and create an American empire. Doesn't mean it was (or would have been) policy, though. Just posturing.

In any case an act in the 19th century firing on someone's fortifications was generally considered an act of war.

Generally, yes, but someone maintaining fortifications in another's country (and South Carolina's sovereigty preceded the existence of the US), was also considered an act of war.

It was at least up to Davis to abjectly apologize to Lincoln. Failing to do that was sort of saying "I'm not sorry I did that and I'll do it again if I feel like it."

Personally, I'd have gotten the hotheads together, told 'em to call of their dawgs for a few months, so we could run every damn bail of cotton out to Europe we could, in trade for Enfield muskets and decent rifled artillery for counterbattery work. Even after Sumter, there was plenty of opportunity to do that.

In former times this pretty much usually resulted in war. Come to think of it, if it happened in this centruy the aggressor would at least have to declare his intent to make amends in order to rpevnt war.

In this case, however, there is a unique situation in that fundamental issues of sovereignty and constitutional limits on Federal power were involved, not a dispute between originally independent powers.