Patton was right

[Sava]

Ned, I'm not saying that the principles of the strategy weren't used in Iraq, or that they didn't work. I'm saying you can't effectively compare Iraq vs US to Axis vs Allies.

[Lawrence of Arabia]

Market Garden was a good idea. It could have won the war right there, and it was very risky, The allies failed because they depended on only one road to bring their supplies to the paras. If they had dropped on a wider area, then they would not have had the problem of trying to keep the roads open for the supply convoys.

[Ned]

Originally posted by Sava
Ned, I'm not saying that the principles of the strategy weren't used in Iraq, or that they didn't work. I'm saying you can't effectively compare Iraq vs US to Axis vs Allies.

I agree that the Axis ground forces were absolutely superb vs. the Iraqi's. But the disparity in airpower was just as great if not greater. True, bombs were not as accurate then, but we carpet bombed German forces with 1,000's of heavy bombers and mauled anything that moved with an even greater number of ground attack fighters. Our airpower advantage over the Germans was decisive.

Given this, we should have conducted the war in a manner that consistently worked to our advantage, not theirs. The breakout from Normandy used our air supremacy to our advantage. But the subsequent broad frontal attack allowed the Germans to use dug in infrantry and artillery to their advantage, and to concentrate their forces for a counterattack. Meanwhile, our bombers were again "wasted" on strategic bombing.

[gsmoove23]

Your comparisons between airpower are not true as our planes were much more susceptable to German AA.

[chequita guevara]

The Allies didn't have air supremacy or even air control.

[chequita guevara]

Originally posted by Ned
As to Patton being an overrated general - well, it seems to me that he and his troops performed very well. But the idea with blitz warfare is to destroy enemy divisions with airpower. In order to counterattack, the enemy must move. When they move, they are exposed to airpower and can be destroyed.

Actually, this is incorrect. The purpose of airpower in the blitzkrieg (which was developed by B.H. Liddel-Hart, not Guderian, Hitler, Patton, or anyone else) is to disrupt communications and interdict supplies, reinforcements, and retreat. Armor punches a hole in enemy lines and surrounds the enemy, which then is left which is then left with the choice of trying to fight while surrounded or surrendering.

Franks used a modified blitzkrieg, in which airpower did much of the killing, rather than armor and infantry.

Finally, remember, Patton got clobbered at Kaserine Pass (my jr. high history teacher was in that battle and got run over by a tank--fortunately for him, it passed right over him--he was also at the Bulge).

[Sava]

Originally posted by chegitz guevara
The Allies didn't have air supremacy or even air control.

Correct, to some extent. In '45, the Allies enjoyed relative air supremacy, but in '44, there was nobody who had aerial superiority. And aerial bombardment was not very accurate against troops. The Allies had no choice but to engage the dug in German ground forces. It's not like inaccurate "dumb" bombs were going to wipe out infantry positions. Even the most accurate strategic bombing wasn't good enough to stop the V1 and V2 rocket production. IIRC, they were being launched against London even in '45.

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

While its true Patton was clobbered at Kasserine, given the fact that he had just barely met his troops, he was not able to fashion them/train them yet nor able to employ armor effectively. Air power was not his to command etc. Patton was first and foremost a cavalry general. Kasserine was primarily fought by US 'green' infantry without his armored forces one might say he was ordinary. Certainly when you think generals that were better at managing the infantry grunts you think first and foremost of Omar Bradley.

Speaking of which, of the US WW2 generals to me the one Franks reminds me most is Bradley. No apparent prima donna syndrome (ala Monty and Patton) visible in him to my mind.

In any event, I'll give him a pass (pun intended) on Kasserine due to the circumstances.

[Darius871]

Originally posted by chegitz guevara

Patton got clobbered at Kaserine Pass

Originally posted by Ogie Oglethorpe
While its true Patton was clobbered at Kasserine,

In any event, I'll give him a pass (pun intended) on Kasserine due to the circumstances.

Um, wasn't Fredenhall in command at the time, and didn't Patton replace him as a direct result of Kasserine?

[Ogie Oglethorpe]

I believe you are correct although I think Patton was in the theatre and was awaiting command. His original assignment being of an observer an advisor (code words for successor).

Regardless, as a result of Kasserine he made rapid changes to enable the US army to be an effective fighting force.

[Tingkai]

Originally posted by chegitz guevara
Actually, this is incorrect. The purpose of airpower in the blitzkrieg (which was developed by B.H. Liddel-Hart, not Guderian, Hitler, Patton, or anyone else) is to disrupt...

The intro for the edition I have of Guderian's book claims that Liddel-Hart edited the first translation and inserted comments that made L-H look good. The added comments had Guderian saying he developed his theories after reading L-h's theories. Talk about the victors writing history.

[yavoon]

I wouldn't have done it even if it was a master stroke. cuz just staying the course america's industrial superiority was going to win the war. I doubt there would have been a compelling reason to risk the more daring strategy when winning was becoming an inevitability and there was no political opposition to worry about.

[Spiffor]

What about the Soviet opposition ? I would think the allies pretty much wanted to minimize Soviet influence as much as possible, and that it was an important concern.

[yavoon]

true, it was a race to claim post war territory.

[Sikander]

Originally posted by gsmoove23
Airpower wasn't anywhere near as effective as it is today, at the mercy of weather conditions, frightfully inaccurate bombing technology, far more vulnerable to German AA... Frankly, the forces were far to equally matched for this to be possible and the Germans were far too adept at these tactics and their counters. We would have been offering too many vulnerabilities to an enemy who was all too able to capitalize.

...and yeah, supply was a problem even without a rapid advance.

While planes were not nearly as capable, neither was AA fire. The differences of course are that the capability to attack from the air has grown at a much greater rate than the capability to exact a price from aircraft. The one area where you fail to note a very large difference today is the capability for aircraft to operate at night. Even with the vast numbers of aircraft operating at the time, WW2 era air forces could do very little to nothing in reaction to enemy movement during the hours of darkness, and often for a while after dawn as they made their way toward their area of operation. Carpet bombing of the type that Ned is enamored of took days to arrange, and would have not been capable of dealing with anything but a static defense, and even then it was a very blunt instrument.

[Alinestra Covelia]

Originally posted by Spiffor
Comparing the end of Hitler with the end of Saddam is absolutely pathetic from a serious source like Time.

Likening TIME magazine to a "serious source" is a mistake.

TIME's founder once said it is not important to present the truth - merely what the truth should be.

Even more interesting, he was applying it to his coverage of China. (TIME lionized Chiang Kai Shek whilst reviling Mao and even moderate premier Zhou En Lai.)

If they've both got moustaches and were dictators of countries that the US doesn't like, then it's good enough for TIME.

[Urban Ranger]

Originally posted by Sikander
While planes were not nearly as capable, neither was AA fire. The differences of course are that the capability to attack from the air has grown at a much greater rate than the capability to exact a price from aircraft.

This is far from certain. After WWII, there wasn't one war fought between two technologically similar countries. Sure, the US warplanes could pound the hell out of Iraq, but that doesn't mean anything. A lot of Russian AA equipment is very sophisticated. In fact, both the S-300 and S-400 surpasses anything the West has.

[CerberusIV]

The differences between western europe in 1944 and iraq in 2003 are terrain and weather. Western europe has numerous minor and major rivers which european armies are trained to use as defensive barriers. The road system was much less developed than now and areas of forest and hills made life much more difficult for attackers.

Southern and central Iraq is relatively flat desert with few major watercourses and the Iraqis failed to destroy the bridges.

It may be getting hot now but Iraq doesn't have rain every day or fog and snow - all of which could ground airpower in 1944.

Patton's idea may have been good in theory but the means to carry it out and the circumstances in 1944 leave it as a beguiling theory, nothing more.

[Ned]

Certainly, the Germans used the Blizkrieg to their advantage when they had the airpower. I believe the Russians employed it repeatedly and continuously against the Germans on the Eastern front. We used it in the initial breakout from Normandy, but not thereafter. It is a wonder than any would seriously doubt that it would work.

If you have the airpower to punch holes in the defensive front, your armored forces can exploit without serious resistance. I still do not see any real problem in France in the summer of '44. To say that the Germans could put up a stiff resistance here and there is probably true, but beside the point. The blitzkrieg attacks at a point of weakness and bypasses strong points to be surrounded and reduced by follow-on forces. Once the bliz is moving, it cannot be stopped until they outrun their fuel and ammo supplies, outrun their air support or reach their objective.

[Vanguard]

Market-Garden was a sound plan, destroyed by faulty intelligence and bad luck. If the Brits had been able to get reliable intel about the 2 panzer divisions in the area they would not have launched the attack. As it was, it was a complete failure for that reason IMO.

I can't agree with this.

Market-Garden was a terrible plan. In order to succeed, the British had to capture three bridges, including one deep behind enemy lines by airborne assault. Failure to capture any one of the bridges doomed the whole mission to failure and ensured the destruction of a parachute division.

And it isn't as if the British had any particular reason to think that they were highly likely to capture all three bridges intact. They were fighting the Germans, after all, not a minor power of dubious competence. Did Monty really think that the Germans were going to let him waltz into Northern Germany without putting up a fight? This seems more like wishful thinking than strategic planning.

And even more doubtful was the question of what we could have done even if the attack had succeeded completely. The Allied supply situation in October was very difficult to start with. Trying to supply an army over the Rhine by means of one road and three bridges hardly seems feasible.

[Ned]

No one since WWII has conducted an operation like Market Garden. However, there been many examples of Blitzkrieg type warfare. The Israelis have employed at at least three times in the Sinai. We use it in Desert Storm and now in Iraqi Freedom.

But also like to point out that they German offensive called the Battle of the Bulge failed for at least two reasons: 1) they did not have air superiority and could not protect the bulge against counterattacks on their flanks and could not obliterate dug-in opposition at the point of the spear; and 2) they did not have enough fuel to keep the spearhead moving forward.

However, I do admit that if Berlin failed to fall immediately, it may have turned into another Stalingrad. I believe this may have been why Ike chose a more conservative approach.